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1. Introduction 
The development of a de facto precedent in EU law has recently been the subject of 
significant academic debate. There is no official doctrine of precedent in EU law—
historically, a doctrine of binding precedent would have been entirely inappropriate in what 
was originally 
a court of first and last resort, many of whose decisions could only be changed 
by amending the Treaties … it was imperative that the Court should have the 
power to … depart from its previous decisions.1 
                                                            
* Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of Exeter. This paper is based on the results of 
periods of participant observation at the ECJ of the European Communities undertaken 
between 2002 and 2006; all comments/criticisms are welcome (k.mcauliffe@exeter.ac.uk). 
Unless otherwise indicated all quotes are taken from interviews with référendaires, judges, 
advocates general, and lawyer-linguists at that Court. 
I would like to thank Dr Robert Harmsen of the University of Luxembourg for his support 
and valuable comments. I would also like to thank my former colleagues at the ECJ in 
Luxembourg for their assistance with this research—in particular Mr Alfredo Calot-Escobar 
and Ms Susan Wright. 
Any errors are mine alone. 
1 A Arnull, ‘Owning Up to Fallibility: Precedent and the Court of Justice’ (1993) 30 CMLR 
247, 248. 
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In spite of this, however, the Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) does on occasion 
appear to regard its previous decisions as establishing law that should be applied in later 
disputes. For example, as noted by Komarek, the ECJ’s line of cases beginning with 
Brasserie du Pêcheur/Factortame III2 (establishing liability of the state for breach of EU 
obligations) changes the distinction between ‘binding force’ and ‘legal effects’ of the ECJ’s 
judgments as drawn by Toth in 19843: following this line of case law it appears that the ECJ 
has introduced a system of precedent and ‘tied down’ national courts without establishing a 
formal hierarchy in the strict sense.4 Thus, in spite of the fact that the doctrine of stare decisis 
was not formally recognised by the civil law tradition of the EU’s founding states, nor by 
international law, the ECJ ‘worked assiduously to develop what is now a robust and taken-
for-granted set of practices associated with precedent’.5 While those practices may well be 
‘taken-for-granted’ this is not to say that they are clear or uncomplicated. As Komarek points 
out, the EU brings together many different legal orders from civil and common law traditions 
and the result, in terms of the status of the ECJ’s decisions in EU law is somewhat puzzling.6 
                                                            
2 Joined Cases C-46/93 and C-48/93. 
3 A Toth, ‘The authority of judgments of the European Court of Justice: Binding force and 
legal effects’ (1984) 4 Yearbook of European Law 1. 
4 J Komarek, ‘Federal Elements in the Community Judicial System: Building Coherence in 
the Community Legal Order’ (2005) 42 CMLR 9, 16. See, in particular, the Köbler and Larsy 
decisions. 
5 Alec Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2004), 97–8 
6 J Komarek, ‘Judicial lawmaking and precedent in supreme courts: The European Court of 
Justice compared to the US Supreme Court and the French Cour de cassation’ (2008–09) 11 
CYELS 399. 
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On the one hand, according to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) 
Art.228, the decisions of the ECJ are binding only on those to whom they are addressed. On 
the other hand, however, in order to know how to apply the substantive law of the EU, we 
must consult decisions of the ECJ. Furthermore, it is in fact through those decisions that the 
EU legal order has developed: it is generally accepted that most of the ‘constitutional law’ of 
the EU has been developed, not in the treaties, but through the case law of the ECJ.7 As 
Komarek states, this ‘puzzle’ of EU law is well illustrated by the major treatise on the EU 
judicial system which states that the ‘case law—those in theory not formally binding—is 
often the most important source of law’.8 Certainly, ‘judicial supremacy has been a central 
seam in the EU legal order’.9 
There are, of course, many different interpretations of the notion of precedent. The 
question of whether precedent refers to normative implications that a judgment may have 
beyond the context of a particular case or to the strict formal binding force of a judgment is a 
perennial one. In EU law, the development of ‘precedent’ is inextricably linked to the 
procedure for references for a preliminary ruling under TFEU Art.267. It is often said that 
national courts are ‘European courts’, but equally the ECJ is ‘not merely a supranational 
court’ but in the fields of ‘civil, criminal and administrative law … has become part of 
                                                            
7 In particular the doctrines of Supremacy and Direct Effect. cf. Case 26/62 Van Gend en 
Loos v Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1; Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL 
[1964] ECR 585. Over the years the parameters of those two doctrines have gradually been 
broadened. 
8 Komarek, ‘Judicial lawmaking and precedent in supreme courts’ (cited in n.6). 
9 Komarek, ‘Judicial lawmaking and precedent in supreme courts’ (cited in n.6). 
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national judicial structures’.10 And it fulfils all of its roles in this regard through the 
preliminary ruling procedure. The ECJ has based much of its reasoning in relation to both the 
development of the principle that its decisions have binding force on all national courts as 
well as other authorities11 and justifying its jurisdiction and decisions under TFEU Art.267 on 
the need to ensure the ‘uniform application of EU law’. The question raised by commentators 
researching ‘precedent’ in EU law is thus: what exactly is meant by uniformity? It is 
generally agreed that ‘absolute sameness’ is unachievable in any legal system12; and 
Chalmers notes that more ‘precedents’ do not necessarily mean more uniformity.13 According 
to Dyrberg, however, ‘uniform application is … a sort of existential problem to which the 
[Union] legal order has to relate’14—i.e. that a presumption of uniformity is necessary for the 
ECJ to claim authoritative status within the EU legal order—which, as pointed out by 
Komarek, aims at supremacy of EU law rather than uniformity itself.15 
                                                            
10 J Komarek, ‘In the Court(s) We Trust? On the need for hierarchy and differentiation in the 
preliminary ruling procedure’ (2007) European Law Review 467, 484. 
11 See, in particular the Köbler decision, which attaches the sanction of liability in the case of 
non-compliance with the Court’s previous case law. 
12 M Dougan, National Remedies Before the Court of Justice. Issues of Harmonisation and 
Differentiation (Hart, Oxford, 2004); Komarek, ‘In the Court(s) We Trust?’ (cited in n.10). 
13 D Chalmers, ‘The dynamics of judicial authority and the Constitutional Treaty’ in 
Altneuland: The EU Constitution in a Contextual Perspective, JHH Weiler and CL Eisgruber 
(eds) (Jean Monnet Working Paper 5/04, 2004). 
14 P Dyrberg, ‘What Should the Court of Justice be Doing?’ (2001) 26 European Law Review 
291. 
15 Komarek, ‘In the Court(s) We Trust?’ (cited in n.10). 
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It is clear that these questions surrounding the concept of precedent itself and the 
meaning or understanding of that concept in the EU legal order will continue to interest 
scholars for some time to come. There is, however, one important aspect of the development 
of a de facto precedent in ECJ judgments which has been thus far overlooked in the literature: 
the linguistic aspect. The present paper seeks to address that gap in the literature by analysing 
the process behind the drafting of judgments at that court. 
2. Drafting judgments at the ECJ 
There are 23 potential languages of procedure for actions before the ECJ.16 For practical 
purposes, that court operates using a single internal working language—French.17 The Rules 
of Procedure provide that judges or advocates general may request the translation of any 
document into the language of their choice.18 However, the members have been obliged to 
forgo that choice in order not to increase the workload of the translation service and, the 
judges must work solely in French. However, because French is rarely the mother tongue of 
                                                            
16 The 23 ‘official languages’ of the EU. These are, in English alphabetical order: Bulgarian; 
Czech; Danish; Dutch; English; Estonian; Finnish; French; German; Greek; Hungarian; Irish; 
Italian; Latvian; Lithuanian; Maltese; Polish; Portuguese; Romanian; Slovakian; Slovenian; 
Spanish: and Swedish. The official order of these languages is to list them according to the 
way they are spelled each in their own language. 
17 The Rules of Procedure of the ECJ state (in Art.29(5)) that ‘The President of the Court and 
the Presidents of Chambers in conducting oral proceedings, the Judge Rapporteur both in his 
preliminary report and in his report for the hearing, Judges and Advocates General in putting 
questions and Advocates General in delivering their opinions may use one of the [official 
languages] other than the language of the case’. In practice, however, the language used is 
French. 
18 Rules of Procedure of the ECJ Art.30. 
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those drafting that case law, the texts produced are often stilted and awkward. In addition, 
those drafting such case law are constrained in their use of language and style of writing 
(owing to pressures of technology and in order to reinforce the rule of law). These factors 
have led to the development of a ‘Court French’ which necessarily shapes the case law 
produced and has implications for its development, particularly insofar as it inevitably leads 
to a type of linguistic precedent in that case law. 
Référendaires 
Each judge and advocate general of the Court of Justice and each judge of the General Court 
has a cabinet19—a small team of personal legal assistants and secretaries working exclusively 
for him or her. Those personal legal assistants are known as référendaires,20 and work very 
closely with ‘their’ judge or advocate general, carrying out preliminary research on a case, 
drawing up procedural documents and preparing ‘first drafts’ of judgments, etc. The role of 
the référendaire at the Court of Justice of the European Union has been compared with that 
of the Conseiller-référendaire of the French Cour de Cassation (a judge attached to that court 
to assist its senior members)21 and with the law clerk of the American judicial system.22 
                                                            
19 While ‘cabinet’ may be translated into English as ‘chambers’ the French term is used 
throughout this paper for two reasons: first, to avoid confusion with the use of the word 
‘Chamber’ for a subdivision of the Court; secondly, unlike the English word ‘chambers’, 
‘cabinet’ in the context of the Court is used to refer both to the judge’s or advocate general’s 
suite of rooms and to the staff working there. 
20 Again, the French word référendaire is used throughout this paper instead of the English 
translation ‘legal secretary’, since it is by that title that those assistants are known within the 
Court, the working language being French. 
21 N Brown and T Kennedy, The Court of Justice of the European Communities (Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 2000). 
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There are currently 62 cabinets at the Court of Justice of the European Union (excluding the 
Civil Service Tribunal): there are 27 judges’ cabinets from both the Court of Justice and the 
General Court plus eight advocates general’s cabinets. 
As already mentioned, référendaires work exclusively for the judge or advocate 
general to whose cabinet they are attached. They are recruited by the Member him- or herself 
and, that being so, they are not permanent staff of the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
The minimum requirement to be a référendaire at the Court of Justice is to be a qualified 
lawyer with a good knowledge of EU law and with at least a reasonable knowledge of 
French.23 Almost without exception référendaires come from backgrounds of ‘practising’ 
lawyers—be they members of the bar of their own Member States, lawyers in large European 
law firms or, as is the case for many from civil law jurisdictions, law clerks for Member State 
courts or government agencies/organisations. When new judges or advocates general come to 
the Court they generally bring their own staff with them, although they sometimes keep the 
staff of the cabinet of the departing Member and they do frequently try to recruit as least one 
référendaire from the institution itself as: 
it is useful to have at least one member of the cabinet who knows and 
understands how the institution works [judge]. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
22 SJ Kenney, ‘Beyond Principals and Agents: Seeing courts as organizations by comparing 
Référendaires at the European Court of Justice and Law Clerks at the U.S. Supreme Court’ 
(2000) 33 Comparative Political Studies 593. 
23 In spite of the fact that référendaires are required to work wholly in French they are not 
required to have a ‘perfect’ command of that language. If a référendaire is not sufficiently 
competent in the French language, however, it can cause problems for the judge in whose 
cabinet he or she works—as discussed later in this paper. 
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Increasingly, however, lawyer-linguists from the ECJ’s Translation Directorate are being 
seconded to cabinets to work as référendaires. Of the 13 référendaires interviewed for the 
purposes of the present paper, two had previously worked as lawyer-linguists at the Court 
(and are officially classed as lawyer-linguists on ‘indefinite secondment’); seven had worked 
as ‘practising lawyers’ (at the bar or for law firms); three as law clerks; and one as a legal 
academic before coming to the Court. It is common for the référendaires to be of the same 
nationality as the judge or advocate general to whose cabinet they are attached; however this 
is by no means invariably the case—in fact, many judges attempt to have at least one 
francophone référendaire in their cabinet (since the internal working language of the Court is 
French and all judges’ référendaires must work entirely in French). 
The role of a référendaire differs to a considerable degree depending on whether 
he/she works for a judge, the President of the Court, or an advocate general. The present 
paper is concerned only with judge’s référendaires, whose role is principally to assist the 
judge in drafting documents such as reports for the hearing, judgments, and, in the case of the 
presidents of the Court of Justice and the General Court, orders. 
Judges’ référendaires and the drafting process 
In a judge’s cabinet, référendaires work on cases for which ‘their’ judge is the judge 
rapporteur and on other cases that are being heard by the chamber in which their judge sits 
but for which he or she is not rapporteur.24 Because of the extremely high workload at the 
                                                            
24 For every action before the Court a ‘judge rapporteur’ is appointed by the President of the 
Court. The judge rapporteur is responsible for monitoring the progress of the case, drafting 
the reports at various stages of the procedure as well as the draft judgment. 
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Court, it is not possible to allocate work to référendaires on the basis of expertise.25 All of the 
référendaires interviewed for the purposes of the present paper claimed that they had to be 
‘generalists’ who are ‘knowledgeable about every area of EU law’. Not only that, they also 
have to be able to understand and use their knowledge in French—a language that may not be 
(and indeed in most cases is not) their mother tongue. 
Once a case has been assigned to the judge rapporteur, the référendaire dealing with 
that case will open a file and wait for the submissions to be lodged at the registry of the Court 
and, where necessary, be translated into French. Not until all of the documents have been 
translated can the référendaire begin to prepare the preliminary report (rapport préalable) 
and, where relevant, the report for the hearing.26 The report for the hearing is basically a 
summary of the facts alleged and arguments of the parties and interveners (if any). It is 
drafted in French and a version of that report in the language of the case is sent to the parties 
and, at the hearing, it is made public, also in the language of the case.27 Because it is a public 
document which is sent to the parties (who may object) the référendaire’s hands are tied as 
regards framing the facts or arguments in a particular way—the report for the hearing is 
                                                            
25 cf. K McAuliffe, ‘Hybrid Texts and Uniform Law? The Multilingual Case Law of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union’ (2011) 24(1) International Journal for the Semiotics 
of Law. 
26 In reality many cabinets begin drafting the preliminary report, the report for the hearing, 
and sometimes even the judgment (as reported by a référendaire from one particular cabinet) 
as soon as all of the parties’ submissions have been lodged, i.e. without waiting for 
translation of those documents. 
27 Note: until 2004 where there was no hearing in a case the report produced was known as 
the report of the judge rapporteur. However, the practice of producing such a report in cases 
that do not require an oral hearing was abolished in 2004. 
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therefore often largely ‘cut-and-paste’ from the relevant submissions.28 The preliminary 
report, which is also written in French, is usually drafted in parallel with the report for the 
hearing. Those two documents are largely the same in their summary of the facts, law, and 
relevant arguments. However, the preliminary report is an internal document and it contains a 
section known as the ‘Observations of the Judge-Rapporteur’, which comprises the judge 
rapporteur’s opinion on the case and his or her recommendations as to how the Court should 
rule. 
Following the delivery of the advocate general’s opinion, the judge rapporteur may 
begin to draft the judgment.29 In reality it is the référendaire assigned to the case who drafts, 
                                                            
28 Note: this practice is considered ‘dangerous’ by the vast majority of lawyer-linguists at the 
Court since the documents from which the référendaires usually ‘cut-and-paste’ are in fact 
translations of the original submissions—aside from the accepted ‘approximation’ in the 
translation process, those translations are often rushed and frequently contain discrepancies or 
even errors. For this reason, many lawyer-linguists actually go back to the original 
submissions when translating the report for the hearing ‘back’ into the language of the case 
(cf. Karen McAuliffe, ‘Law in Translation: The Production of a Multilingual Jurisprudence 
by the Court of Justice of the European Communities’, PhD Thesis, The Queen’s University 
of Belfast, 2006). The real danger, however, arises at the stage of translation of the 
judgment—if the lawyer-linguist in question does not understand the language of the case 
and so cannot consult either the original submissions or the translated report for the hearing 
but must work only from the French version, he or she may not be aware of any problems or 
discrepancies. 
29 Note: an opinion is not given in every case before the Court of Justice (since 2004 if a case 
raises no new questions of law then an advocate general’s opinion is not necessary); an 
‘advocate general’s opinion’ may exceptionally be given in cases before the General Court 
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at least the first version, of that judgment. Officially judgments are drafted, discussed, and 
deliberated on in French; however, it has occasionally been the case that certain General 
Court competition law cases, in which the language of the case was English, were dealt with 
entirely in that language.30 Unofficially, a number of référendaires interviewed during the 
course of fieldwork research for the present paper reported drafting ‘half in [their own mother 
tongue] and half in French’, many working from glossaries that they had constructed 
themselves on the basis of ‘the settled case law of the Court’: 
I usually know what I want to say in my own language and then I look at my 
glossary to find something similar that the Court has said before and use that 
to help me draft; 
as a starting point … I scan my glossary of French terms and phrases 
frequently used by the Court and find something that covers the gist of what I 
want to say; 
I will usually have a basic idea in my head of the direction I want to go in and 
what I want to say and then I use the set phrases that I have collated in my 
glossary to start me off and shape what I write. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
(Rules of Procedure of the General Court Arts 17–19). However, in such an event, the 
opinion will be drafted by a judge of the General Court who has been designated ‘advocate 
general’ in a specific case (Rules of Procedure of the General Court Art.2). 
30 This has occurred only a handful of times, and is officially ‘frowned upon’ by the Court of 
Justice, in particular when such cases come before the Court of Justice on appeal and there 
are no French documents available from which that Court can work. See McAuliffe, ‘Law in 
Translation’ (cited in n.28) for commentary on the use of English at the General Court since 
the May 2004 enlargement. 
McAuliffe, K, Precedent at the ECJ: The Linguistic Aspect’, Current Legal Issues, vol. 15, 2013, 483-493  
3. Difficulties of and constraints in drafting: producing a linguistic 
precedent? 
None of the référendaires interviewed for the purposes of the present paper admitted having 
any difficulty drafting documents in a language that is not their mother tongue (where 
relevant). Indeed the only référendaires who claimed to have such difficulties were the 
francophone référendaires who ‘simply can’t bear’ to draft in the ‘formulaic, synthetic 
French used at the Court’! 
The mechanical French that is used at the Court is so far removed from 
‘proper’ or ‘real’ French that it is almost like another language entirely; 
The French used at the Court is not ‘real’ French but a type of ‘Court French’. 
Some commented that having to work in French (where it is not their mother tongue) ‘slowed 
them down’, but that, as a result of the rigid formulaic style in which they are ‘required’ to 
draft judgments: 
working in ‘Court French’ is actually easier than drafting in your own 
language—provided that you don’t actually want to write anything of your 
own” [interviewee’s emphasis]; 
Judgments are time-consuming but most are easy to draft because it has all 
already been said by the Court—maybe once in five or six years a case will 
come along that might have one single paragraph saying something 
completely new or different; 
you never get to produce anything original … you just write according to the 
template provided … in fact I felt little more than a report-writing machine! 
When questioned about the concept of precedent in EU law, every référendaire interviewed 
acknowledged that, strictly speaking, there is no rule of precedent within the EU court system 
and in theory the ECJ and the General Court are not bound by their own previous decisions. 
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In spite of that, however, it is clear that those référendaires feel constrained by the language 
used by ‘the Court’ and that the judgments they draft reflect their perceptions of such 
constraint: 
We must draft using the language that has been used by the Court for over 50 
years; 
We are under pressure to cite ‘word-for-word’ when taking material from 
source documents … in particular from past judgments; 
We work from templates, and the translators work from templates … so we 
cut and paste from previous judgments and the process works for everyone. 
There are two main reasons for these perceived constraints: first, some argue that since the 
Court is building up a European case law and rule of law, it is necessary to use the same 
terminology constantly throughout that case law: 
what you are dealing with is the rule of law in a legal system that is still 
developing, therefore it is important to use the same terminology and phrases 
all of the time, in particular because that legal system is expressed in many 
different languages. 
In addition, it is often necessary, in judgments, orders, reports, etc., to refer to provisions of 
relevant EU legislation. When making such references, référendaires are obliged to use the 
same specific wording used in the provision in question.31 
Secondly, as one référendaire put it: ‘the pressure of computers is significant’. 
With the advent and increasing use of the GTI32 at the Court it has become 
important to cite entire phrases instead of merely referring to them or even 
                                                            
31 McAuliffe,  ‘Law in Translation’ (cited in n.28). 
32 The GTI is a computer programme developed by the Court of Justice to aid and speed up 
the translation process at that Court. 
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paraphrasing. Then that phrase will be translated sentence-for-sentence since 
there is the danger that the text ‘pulled up’ by the GTI might not fit into the 
context of the case in hand unless every single word is exactly the same. There 
is a huge pressure for one single word to be translatable into another single 
word, which of course is rarely the case; 
We are obliged to use the same language over and over—to ‘copy-paste’ from 
previous decisions, reports or orders so that the computer programme will pick 
it up for easy and quick translation. That way translation is also safer as it will 
not be wrong—it has already been translated and that is now the way that [the 
relevant concept] is in the case law. It’s like a precedent [interviewee’s 
emphasis]. 
On top of such perceptions of constraint as regards the language that they feel they ‘should’ 
use, référendaires are, for the most part, working in a language that is not their mother 
tongue. This has been the case since the early days of the ECJ. For that reason alone there is, 
and always has been, a tendency to use the same expressions over and over again: 
because we are writing in a foreign language there is a tendency to do a lot of 
‘cutting and pasting’ and so the style [in which the Court’s judgments, orders, 
etc. are written] reproduces itself; 
Working in a language that isn’t your own makes you slower but it is not 
especially difficult because the Court has its own style that you just rigidly 
follow; 
My French is very good, but when I am drafting judgments I will copy-
paste—because I can’t say it better than that way that I have read it in the 
settled case law. 
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Thus it seems that in spite of the claims of the majority of the référendaires that they find it 
relatively non-problematic to draft in French, it nonetheless has consequences. The ‘Court 
style’ of drafting by which those référendaires feel so constrained is shaped in a large part 
because of the fact that they are drafting in a language that is not their mother tongue. As one 
référendaire pointed out: 
Drafting in a language that is not your mother tongue makes a big difference 
to the way that you write. When you write in your mother tongue it flows 
more naturally, it is an unconscious exercise (language-wise), words and 
phrases flow from associations made by your brain by drawing on a lifetime’s 
use of the language … When you are writing in a language that is not your 
mother tongue you have to boil down the semantics of what you want to say 
into one thread, into the essential of what you want to say—then you have to 
put your sentences together and you end up using clumsy and clunky 
connections. 
Three of the référendaires interviewed during the first stage of fieldwork research for the 
present paper feel that because they are ‘generalists’ as opposed to specialists in a particular 
area of European law, being thus restrained as regards drafting judgments is actually very 
useful as ‘there is less risk of getting things wrong’: 
In your own language you have a huge choice of words and phrases and so 
there is more risk of making a mistake where you are drafting a judgment 
concerning an area of EU law that you may not be expert in33; 
                                                            
33 However, according to some lawyer-linguists such mistakes are even more likely where the 
référendaire does not fully understand the implications of the translation of their choice of 
wording or terminology in French—cf. McAuliffe, ‘Law in Translation’ (cited in n.28), 168–
70. 
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Because of the workload we cannot specialise in a particular area of EU law, 
so maybe it is better that we are tied to templates … we are less likely to make 
a mistake this way. 
However, the vast majority of those interviewed feel frustrated at the constraints under which 
they must draft: 
it is irritating not to have control over how you can express concepts and 
frustrating to be tied into the ‘Court style’ of drafting … only a small 
percentage of what we draft actually shows any originality at all. 
Another aspect of drafting that galls the majority of référendaires interviewed (13) is the 
‘pompous tone’ of the Court’s judgments. That tone seems to be based on the tone of 
judgments of the French Cour de Cassation and most référendaires, and indeed many 
members of the Court, feel that it is quite unnecessary34: 
[the référendaires] only write in that stuffy way because they know that if they 
don’t the lecteurs d’arrêts will return the document to the cabinet having 
changed its tone entirely. 
Référendaires also complain that, on top of that, the lecteurs d’arrêts35 read their texts with a 
view to whether they will be easy or difficult to translate and that they insist on reducing 
connecting phrases, etc. to a basic and quite simple level so that they will be easy to translate: 
                                                            
34 It must be noted that that ‘pompous tone’ appears to have gradually crept into the 
judgments of the Court of Justice. In the 1970s (when, incidentally, the President of the Court 
was a German, Judge Kutcher) the judgments of that Court were much lighter and ‘not so 
stuffy’. 
35 The lecteurs d’arrêts are francophone lawyers who ensure that the judgments read fluently 
yet remain sufficiently clear and precise. 
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they push it so far, however, that [the référendaires] are forced to use childish 
links and are left with infantile simplicity in a complex text with a pompous 
tone! 
An interesting result of référendaires feeling constrained in their style of drafting and bound 
by the language previously used by the Court is that a type of linguistic precedent is 
developing in judgments of the Court of Justice in spite of the fact that no such rule actually 
exists within the EU court system: 
decisions of the Court are treated as ‘stare decisis’[sic] even though, on paper, 
those decisions are not binding on future decisions of the Court … sometimes 
it seems that precedent is even more binding at the Court than it is in a 
common law country! [interviewee’s emphasis]. 
Those référendaires interviewed who commented on that phenomenon claim that the reasons 
for this development of a de facto rule of precedent in Court of Justice judgments are (a) the 
relative inexperience of most of the référendaires: 
who is going to change the wording or contradict something set out by the 
Court in a previous judgment? 
and (b) since most référendaires are drafting in a language that is not their mother tongue and 
are not as confident as they would be in their own language they tend to use direct quotes and 
‘take entire chunks’ from previous judgments. As a result: 
phrases are chiselled out of the rock face of the European Court Reports and 
considered to be immutable—there is a de facto stare decisis. 
4. Collegiate judgments 
A final factor that restricts how judgments are drafted and thus affects the development of the 
linguistic style of the Court’s case law is the collegiate nature of those judgments. Those 
judgments are, by their very nature, often compromise documents. However, because the 
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deliberations of the Court of Justice are secret and no dissenting opinions are published, it is 
impossible for anyone other than the judges involved in those deliberations to know where 
such compromises lie in the text. As many of the référendaires interviewed commented: 
you don’t always know which have been the ‘contentious’ points in the 
deliberation … or how important a specific wording of a particular phrase may 
be … therefore it is safer just to stick with phrases that may sound awkward or 
badly-worded instead of changing them to sound better; 
there may be part of a judgment that took a long time for the judges to reach a 
compromise [on]. My judge may be able to tell me which parts are the most 
important without breaching the secret of the deliberations, but how can I 
really know? So when a part of a judgment is re-drafted in the secret 
deliberations I should leave the wording exactly as it is—even if it doesn’t 
make full sense to me, it may be a sign of a compromise between the judges; 
if the judges have made a compromise in a previous judgment—how would I 
know? If something seems vague I can’t change the wording to make it more 
clear because maybe the Court wanted it to be vague—the deliberations are a 
secret so we will never know. But to be safe we should just repeat the same 
language. 
It seems, therefore, that there are a number of difficulties involved in the creation or drafting 
of the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union. On top of having to draft that 
case law in a language that, in most cases, is not their mother tongue, the référendaires (and 
indeed the judges) are constrained as regards the language used and the by the fact that the 
judgments of the Court are collegiate in nature. Such constraints necessarily shape the 
linguistic development of that case law and thus the development of EU law. 
5. Conclusion 
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It is clear that the judges and their référendaires at the Court of Justice seem constrained in 
how they can draft judgments and other documents. The question thus arises whether 
language is therefore a constraint on the development of EU law—i.e. does the formulaic 
style that constrains the référendaires in what they can write actually constrain the 
development of the case law? The members of the Court interviewed during the fieldwork 
research for the present paper were of the opinion that, to a certain extent, that is indeed the 
case: 
It is surprising how much the French language influences how the judges 
deliberate and draft judgments—the fact that French is used as the language of 
the deliberations and is the language in which the very formulaic judgments 
are drafted forces [the Court] to speak or rule in a certain way; 
It is often difficult to say exactly what you want to say in a judgment … often 
the Court will want to say X but in the very rigid French of the Court that is 
used in the judgments you have to get around to X by saying that it is not Y! 
… such use of language necessarily has implications for the way in which the 
case law develops. 
Such constraint is perhaps most immediately obvious in the development of a linguistic 
precedent in the judgments of the Court. However, the vast majority of literature on the ECJ 
and on precedent in EU law in particular ignores the linguistic aspect of the development of a 
rule of law. Legal literature is generally concerned with analysing the legal logic behind the 
Court’s rulings and discussing how that Court can affect policy changes in the EU, insofar as 
practice may have to change to comply with a particular ruling. Political science literature is 
interested in ‘judicial politics’, the policy dynamics that can be inferred from the Court’s 
decisions and in examining the political context and consequences of those decisions. 
However, each of these bodies of literature remains predominantly focused on the decisions 
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of the Court and on judicial reasoning and/or investigating the reasons or motivation behind 
those decisions. Much has been written on why the Court makes certain decisions and the 
effects of those decisions, particularly with regard to precedent in the EU; but there has been 
very little research into how its case law is produced and the role of language in the 
production of that case law. Even those academics interested in the actors at the Court are 
primarily interested in argumentation frameworks and organisation theory (courts as 
organisations)36 and ignore the multilingual aspects of that institution. 
This consideration of the linguistic aspect of the development of a de facto precedent 
at the level of the Court of Justice necessarily leads to consideration of how the synthetic 
construction of the Court’s case law may affect the application of that law by national courts 
that may not be aware of the body of EU law as a synthetic construction and will be looking 
for clues as to its application in a national legal language.37 This paper thus highlights a need 
for further research to contribute to the debate mentioned in the introduction, which aims to 
clarify the way in which ‘precedent’ may be developing in the case law of the Court of 
Justice and the effect that may have on the relationship between the ECJ and national courts 
in the context of the preliminary ruling procedure. 
                                                            
36 Stone Sweet, The Judicial Construction of Europe (cited in n.5). 
37 McAuliffe, ‘Hybrid Texts and Uniform Law?’ (cited in n.25). 
